Though these NBA Finals between the Indiana Pacers and Oklahoma City were knotted 1-1 through two games, the free-wheeling, blink-and-be-screwed, fueled-by-fire Pacers’ offense hadn’t much been seen to that point. After Game 3 — a contest Indiana won, 116-107, to take a 2-1 lead heading into Friday’s pivotal Game 4 — those Pacers and their unmistakable identity are no longer absent.
Wednesday night, Indiana’s 117.2 offensive rating marked its highest of the series and the fourth-worst Oklahoma City’s, hell-in-a-cell, limbs-infested defense has surrendered across 19 games. Following two outings at Paycom Center defined by tepid performances from Tyrese Haliburton and Pascal Siakam, and an inability to shake loose in the open floor, the Pacers, behind their All-Star tandem, scored consistently while running early and often in Game 3.
Haliburton tallied 22 points (9-of-17 shooting) and 11 helpers; Siakam added 21 points (8-of-14 shooting) and four assists — high-water marks in both categories for each of them this series. Indiana scored 135.3 points per 100 possessions in transition on a 17.2 percent frequency — steep spikes from the 89.5 points per 100 possessions on a 10.9 percent frequency it yielded the opening two games.
Helping spur smoother fast-break chances was Oklahoma City’s 18.8 percent turnover rate (highest of its 19 playoff games), a number borne through careless decision-making and a feisty Pacers defense, which induced some of that careless decision-making itself.
Yet even when they weren’t pilfering takeaways, they beamed down the floor to put defenders in disadvantageous spots — a theme of the night — and generated lucrative trips, capitalizing on a Thunder team ill-prepared to meet Indiana’s tempo.
The Pacers outclassed their opponent with an organized frenzy and copacetic stars at the helm. Bennedict Mathurin’s 27 points didn’t hurt either. This is how they rose above the rest of the Eastern Conference.
They found themselves in Game 3 through ruthless intentionality. They maximized their offensive depth and uncovered pressure points across Oklahoma City’s rotation, which exacerbated matters by lacking its trademark verve and acuity defensively. While the Thunder defense is tremendous and versatile, capable of stymying an array of attacks however required, it is not flawless.
The logical places to prod at start with lesser defenders like Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Isaiah Joe and Aaron Wiggins, all useful and typically positive cogs. But they’re certainly easier to involve than their All-Defensive Team peers, Luguentz Dort, Alex Caruso and Jalen Williams, as well as the bigs, Chet Holmgren and Isaiah Hartenstein, and second-year guard Cason Wallace, who has All-Defensive Team nods in his future (as does Holmgren).
Those credentials, though, didn’t limit Indiana in who it targeted but rather prompted it to expand how it targeted players. Siakam attacked smaller perimeter stoppers like Dort, Caruso and Wallace inside. Holmgren and Hartenstein were tested in space via off-ball movement or Siakam’s speed. Nobody was off-limits. The entire court remained at its disposal, just as it’s been throughout the playoffs, winning the push-pull against a defense designed to shrink the floor and implement no-fly zones for opponents.
This isn’t to say Gilgeous-Alexander, Wiggins and Joe were not at the center of the Pacers’ intentions. Those three, particularly Gilgeous-Alexander, were put through ball-screen after ball-screen. They understood that although the Thunder may be set up defensively, it did not necessarily mean their preferred assignments were arranged and primed to combat early offensive flow.
Indiana is a dynamite transition group, but it doesn’t always play fast to shoot quickly. It wants to promptly spin defenses into rotation then find an optimal shot whenever it arises. Oklahoma City’s menacing group curtailed much of that spunk the first couple games before failing to in Game 3. The Pacers exploited cross-matches and ignited their pick-and-roll game from the outset of possessions.
They also brought Williams into ball-screen duties. An All-Defensive Second Team honoree this season, the third-year wing is best suited navigating off-ball screens, guarding face-ups, helping as a low man and terrorizing ing lanes. On-ball screens are tricky for him. Indiana took advantage. It granted its ball-handlers space to maneuver by removing (or avoiding) point-of-attack pests such as Dort, Caruso and Wallace from the action and replacing them with Gilgeous-Alexander, Joe, Wiggins and Williams.
Results were fruitful and carried a ripple effect. Despite going 2-of-2 from deep, Joe didn’t play after halftime, while Wiggins saw just three minutes post-intermission. The Thunder rotation narrowed and became even more defensively slanted. They scored 47 points the final 24 minutes. Plenty of responsibility is owed to Indiana’s defense and Oklahoma City’s poorly executed offense. But two offensive-minded reserves being played off the floor certainly contributed as well.
Late in the fourth, Williams was again matched up with Haliburton at the point of attack. Having already choppily waded through a handful of on-ball screens like many of his teammates, he prepped for another and shaded to his left. Doing so, though, handed Haliburton a runway to reject the screen, drive downhill, tilt Oklahoma City’s defense and prime Obi Toppin for a pogo-stick put-back jam.
In Game 2, Siakam and the Pacers failed one other. He wasn’t forceful enough demanding the ball in advantageous spots and they weren’t precise enough looking for him in those situations. According to NBA.com, he saw 48 touches, including a singular post-up and paint touch, and nothing at the elbows — all down from the 55.5 touches, 2.1 post-ups, 3.6 paint touches and 2.8 elbow touches he’s averaging in the playoffs.
There would be no repeat of that Wednesday. He scored their first six points, repeatedly firing over smaller defenders in Gilgeous-Alexander and Dort. His touches perked up to 56, including five elbow touches, five paint touches and three post-ups. After shooting 2-of-12 between 4 and 14 feet the first two games, he was bound for some positive regression. It arrived in the form of a 5-of-8 night from that area.
Once Siakam was rolling early and punishing smaller defenders (even elite ones in Dort and Caruso!), Oklahoma City couldn’t stick to single coverage. Wiggins digs down here, which frees Mathurin for a dive and score (T.J. McConnell’s initial cut to neutralize Gilgeous-Alexander’s help positioning is a savvy wrinkle):
At other points, Siakam was tabbed as an initiator and conducted inverted pick-and-rolls, which threw the Thunder for a loop. Both produced seamless forays inside and free throws. Collectively, Indiana encountered significantly more success on its drives Wednesday than in Games 1 and 2.
After averaging 21 points (42.1 percent shooting) on 48 drives per game the first two nights, the Pacers logged 51 drives and scored 39 points on them (71.4 percent shooting) in Game 3. Plays like these — a mix of schematic shifts and defensive breakdowns — help illuminate that uptick.
No longer burdened much by Dort and Wallace’s point-of-attack peskiness, Haliburton enjoyed newfound breathing room as a pick-and-roll operator. He rounded screens or caught the ball on the move and wasn’t left to decipher beating both his defender and whoever awaited him in the gaps, a challenge which curtailed many of his drives back in Oklahoma City.
He scored eight points (4-of-5 shooting, zero turnovers) on 11 drives, vast improvements from the six points (3-of-6 shooting, three turnovers) on 17 drives he totaled during Games 1 and 2. In particular, he leaned on his floater, a tool he discovered comfort in amid the rubble of Game 2’s blowout defeat.
Independent of any schematic adjustments to wiggle Haliburton free, he pounced on minimal space to shoot in Game 3. Whereas the Thunder’s length and domineering defense had bred hesitancy in him, he didn’t let that deter him anymore and launched over viable contests, taking a series-high 17 shots.
For as calculated and effective as Indiana’s adjustments were, there’s plenty the Thunder can correct to make life tougher offensively. Conceding fewer switches to Haliburton when he receives screens from 35-40 feet out should be a priority. Duck under those suckers and give Dort (or whoever) room to do so; Oklahoma City cleanly went under a few times and stalled the Pacers out.
Transition defense, even after made shots, and locating proper assignments lacked urgency and organization. Closeouts, screen navigation and communicating coverages weren’t up to standard.
A middle ground between what the Pacers imposed and where the Thunder faltered on their own will unfold in Game 4. Indiana probably also won’t shoot 60 percent (21-of-35) from midrange and get 27 points courtesy of Mathurin, just as Oklahoma City won’t hit 47.6 percent (10-of-21) of its long balls. But the sustainability of all this does not matter much at the moment; each Finals game is a unique entity and Indiana is a win closer to the crown than the Thunder.
The Pacers are now on their front foot in this series, exactly how they prefer to be offensively. They look like themselves once more. Oklahoma City, meanwhile, resides on its back foot — a mix of internal gaffes and Indiana’s shrewd game-plan to identify defensive pressure points rarely exposed.
The Thunder built a dominant unit by emphatically defending on their front foot and demanding opposing offenses respond. To even this series up, their response must thrust them onto the front foot again.
